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Introduction
Since mid 2007 the world has faced one of the biggest financial crises ever.
The subprime crisis was the third important financial crisis in the last 12 years. Due to the very complex and intransparent structure of structured finance products and their incalculable systemic relevance, large writedowns and ongoing mistrust is inherent in nearly all financial markets until today.
This mistrust led to a drying-out of important treasury markets like the interbank money market or the secondary market. Even with massive bailouts (€1.873 billion by mid-October 2008) and enhanced money market tender programs (like US-TALF or EU-Repo) a spillover to the real economy could not be avoided but lead to a partial stabilization of international financial markets and a temporary decrease of secondary market spreads.
But as is noted in the CEPS Task Force Report (Lannoo (2008) ) there was no European response to the crisis and from a national point of view this is comprehensible since the impact on European countries has been heterogeneous. Even if this crisis was not a European crisis, one of the hallmarks of the EU´s Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) is questioned: disintermediation and therewith securitization which is a very important factor for the development of a mature capital market beside the financial intermediaries. The integration process of EU financial markets and financial intermediaries proceeds much faster than EU regulation and supervision.
And as it was noted in Lannoo (2008) the EU realized this shortcoming ten years ago and reacted, beside of the start of the monetary union and the launch of the FSAP, with the implementation of Lamfalussy Committee proposals. But even if this reform brought some remarkable results, it was crafted during good market conditions and seems not to be capable of stormy times. More and more experts got the result that we have probably reached the limits of what is possible under the current system and that we need a major step in EU wide financial regulation and supervision reform. Also the politicians are under pressure to adopt a stronger banking regulation and foresee crises with early warning systems. We want to analyze the previous literature about early warning systems and especially have a look at the developments for major structured finance markets in the last two crises. By documentation of the major shortcomings in the present regulatory framework which especially stand out through the last two years of financial distress we evaluate actual regulatory approaches and show the consequences for the world economy. In chapter two we define financial market stability and give a short literature review about early warning systems for financial crises. In chapter three we show in detail the rating behavior of US and European structured finance instruments and detect stylized rating facts. Afterwards we explore the US structured finance issuance and outstanding to detect possible moral hazard intentions that could be prevented through new regulatory approaches. In chapter four we take the findings of chapter two and three and try to find the motivation for the behavior of market participants to originate and invest in structured finance instruments. We do this with the Bearingpoint securitization survey (2009) and with theoretic economic approaches. In chapter five we summarize the findings of the three former chapters and evaluate the actual EU regulation on credit rating agencies, Basel II enhancements and the Basel III consultation paper to differentiate between necessary regulations and possible overregulation.
Financial market stability and early warning systems for financial crises
Before we start discussing the possibility of an early warning system to prevent financial crises it is useful to define financial market stability. We will do this by the negative proof. DeBandt and Hartmann (2002) define a "systemic crisis" as occurring when a shock affects "a considerable number of financial institutions or markets […] , thereby severely impairing the general well-functioning (of an important part) of the financial system. The well functioning of the financial system relates to the effectiveness and efficiency with which savings are channeled into the real investments promising the highest returns. Financial market instability is inherent if major losses are realized during a short time period and if central money markets, like the interbank market, shut down and if systemic important banks struggle".
In the last 15 years the world mentioned three major financial crises. In 1998 the financial markets were shocked through the collapse of the hedge fund LTCM. Like often in financial crises the central bank, in this case the Federal Reserve, organized a $3.5 billion rescue package to prevent a more damaging spillover to systemic important banks and therewith at least also to the real economy. Only three years later, in 2001, the financial distress was due to the "dot-com bubble". An incredible overheating of stock markets related to an incredible growth in the internet sector and related business.
After both crises the world economy slowly recovered and with initiatives like the rework of Basel I there were also initiatives to make the banking system less sensitive to financial crises. In 2007 the "subprime crises" appeared and is the most intense crisis since the Great Depression. Of course after every crisis there were impulsive actions to develop "early warning systems" consisting of lots of financial indicators to forecast future financial crises.
Before we present a short literature review have a look at figure 1. Figure 1 shows the development of the Nasdaq Composite Index between 1994 and 2010. Three crisis, three different reactions of the Nasdaq. This should give us a first indication that every crisis is different and that it is very difficult to forecast financial crises. It is supported by Borio and Drehmann (2009) who noted that the construction of reliable quantitative tools to inform assessments of the build-up of risk in the financial system has proved elusive. Davis (1995 Davis ( , 1999 Davis ( , 2002 mentioned that some features are common to all crises. Borio and Lowe (2002a,b) tested a lot of indicators focusing on the behavior of credit and asset prices. The in sample performance was quite good but has just limited advantages. Only if the same indicators perform as well out of sample they can be considered to indicate systematic risk. Borio and Drehmann (2009) tested the out of sample performance of the indicators to the subprime crisis but without special indicators for securitization. Barrel et al. (2009) used an early warning system with measures of bank capital and liquidity adequacy and of property price growth. They showed that they outperform traditional variables such as GDP growth, inflation and real interest rates. Davis and Karim (2008) used logit and binomial tree approaches that have been successful in predicting banking crises (Karim (2008) ). Overall, the different early warning systems were just partially helpful to predict the subprime crisis. It shows that the sub-prime crisis was different compared to other crises and makes regulation even more difficult.
The challenge of this paper is to analyze the behavior of structured finance rating movements, issuance and outstanding. We want to detect stylized facts and reasons for the subprime crisis to evaluate actual regulatory approaches and show possible early warning indicators.
Stylized facts from structured finance rating behavior and issuance
As noted in Loeffler (2004) rating agencies are important for the stability of financial markets. Ratings are used to price risky debt, to compute economic and regulatory capital, or to calibrate internal ratings of banks. Ratings should give an orientation for default probabilities of the rated assets. They should be stable and assign the same default probability over all asset classes. But is this also true for financial innovations like structured finance instruments?
Structured finance ratings
It is important to understand that every structured finance product is just as good as the underlying assets. To understand the major losses due to structured finance products one step is to analyze if the ratings indeed correlate with the expected default probabilities for each rating category. Standard and Poor´s (2010) calculated the Gini coefficients for different structured finance products. The higher the Gini coefficient the greater is the correlation between the ratings and the structured finance instruments default behavior. As can be seen in the next chart the Gini coefficients were in the 90% area for each product before 2006 which is a good indicator that the ratings matched the expected defaults. The three financial crises (LTCM collapse, "dot com" bubble, subprime crisis) marked in the chart led to lower Gini coefficients. But the decrease of the Gini coefficient due to the last crisis led to significant downturns. Especially the decrease of the Gini coefficient for CDOs to 15% in 2008 questions the ratings methodology. This has direct application to the financial market stability because the whole financial system (especially Basel II, rating trigger) is related to ratings. If the ratings expected default probability differs from the realized defaults enormous consequences for the whole financial system and its stability have to be considered. Ratings are based on a statistical database that no market participant could have in this detail. If market participants do not trust in ratings or in rating agencies they will reduce their interaction with market participants (see also chapter 4). After this first indication we want to analyze the rating transition behavior for structured finance instruments since the year 2000.
Structured finance ratings transition
As estimated by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee (2001, 2003, 2008) In general we can determine that the structured finance ratings reacted in average with a one or two year lag in downgrades to the recession. As a crises threshold value we define in dependence on Fitch (2010) a 10 % downgrade rate. This threshold is based on the historical rating changes statistic for global financial institutions. A downgrade rate higher than 10%
shows an extreme economic downturn. Another reason is that the rating methodology for corporates and corporate bonds is validated. Therewith an extreme exceeding of the 10% threshold in combination with a high spread between structured finance and corporate downgrades provides evidence that the structured finance rating methodology is inappropriate, i.e. a corporate "AAA" is not equivalent to a structured finance "AAA". After this global structured finance rating overview we want to analyze the structured finance rating transition for the USA and Europe in more detail. Long term structured finance ratings are highly volatile and have not the stability expected from a through-the-cycle rating.
USA
The volatility of the structured finance ratings must be due to biased rating methodologies and to incentives to issue structured finance instruments. These incentives could led to moral hazard problems to generate enough underlyings.
After we analyzed the US structured finance ratings behavior we want to compare the results with the European structured finance ratings.
Europe
Figure 5: Based on calculations of S&P (2010) In Europe we should expect lower downgrade rates because of a lower structured finance issuance. The assumption is based on a less developed market for securitization and therewith a higher screening of the securitized underlying. Keys et al. (2009) gives an indication that high issuance of structured finance instruments could lead to less monitoring effort and lax screening. In contrast to the USA the 10% threshold seems to be too high, nevertheless the 10% burden was exceeded in both crises. After the "dot com" bubble we see high downgrade rates for EU CDOs and EU singlename synthetics. The high downgrade rate for EU CDOs could be due to a high risk inherent in the underlying (maybe US structured finance instruments). There are no important downgrades for EU ABS which support the assumption that structured finance issuance is very restrictive and indicates a high underlying quality of the European assets.
The downgrades after the subprime crisis show some differences to the US.
We see the highest downgrade rate for EU CDOs with more than 40% downgrades. This rate is the third highest compared to US downgrades.
Interestingly the downgrade rate for EU CMBS is nearly on the same level as for the US. Also the downgrades for EU single-name synthetics are in the range of the US values. The rise of the EU RMBS downgrades is due to lax screening in the Spanish mortgage market. 
Structured finance ratings summary
The low Gini coefficient for CDOs in the subprime crisis was a first indication that the structured finance rating methodology is wrong. Empirically this was supported by the huge downgrade rates for the US and European structured finance instruments. The structured finance ratings gave no indication for the Therefore we want to analyze the issuance and outstanding to find the main motivations for the crisis and could therewith evaluate actual regulatory enhancements.
Structured finance issuance and outstanding
In the last chapter we analyzed the rating performance and behavior.
International banking regulation frameworks, like Basel II, use external ratings as a proxy for risk and therewith for the determination of regulatory capital. As a next step we want to analyze the structured finance issuance and outstanding. This is necessary to draw conclusions why structured finance instruments were issued. Afterwards we complete the findings to show motivations for securitization. If we neglect for this chapter the question why financial institutions invested in structured finance instruments, we see clear differences in structured finance issuance. We can state that there is dependence between high issuance and high downgrades. This fact may be random for structured finance instruments but reveal the former noted rating methodology failures.
According to that we could determine clear motivations for structured finance issuance, especially for mortgage related instruments. Due to the combination of low US interest rates, social policy, the economic recovery of the "dot com" bubble and the apparently unlimited demand for structured finance instruments, the mortgage supply also seems unlimited. Figure 10 describe the interaction that leads to the crisis. Home equity loan ABS and RMBS were the main underlyings for CDOs (figure 9). If they stagger the CDOs also will stagger. The RMBS with subprime underlyings staggered as the FED increased the main interest rates. But for most of the high quality RMBS this increase was not dramatic. It became dramatic because additionally many people also had home equity loans. Due to that home equity loan ABS, bad and good quality RMBS and CDO² struggle and the crisis was perfect. Together with important failures of the rating methodologies for structured finance instruments and the drying-out of the important interbank markets the world faced one of the biggest financial crises ever.
As a consequence we could say that with a regulation of credit rating agencies, higher risk weights, better banking supervision on risk-and liquidity management and more intensive banking due diligence the crisis could have been prevented. Before we evaluate if the mentioned aspects are incorporated in actual regulatory enhancements or consultation papers, we want to analyze if the banking behavior was rational although the facts and failures were so obvious.
Was banking behavior rational?
The Bearingpoint securitization survey from December 2009 shows valuable insights into the motivation of securitization. Before the subprime crisis one main motivation was the control of assets on the balance sheet to release regulatory capital. It was also possible to gain regulatory arbitrage due to the change to the securitization framework. Other important reasons were better conditions compared to unsecured refinancing, risk transfer and the diversification of liquidity channels. We will support the study by some theoretical approaches.
Due to structured finance issuance a bank had the advantage of possible regulatory gains, gains from securitization and the sale of the tranches, lower refinancing costs risk transfer and balance sheet flexibility. The first theoretical approach describes a cycle that explains the "originateto-distribute" behavior of banks and the nearly unlimited investor demand for structured finance instruments. If we have a look at the low default rates of speculative grade structured finance instruments before the subprime crisis in figure 11 and the enormous issuance due to nearly unlimited investor demand, it was rational on a micro-level to originate structured finance instruments. The reasons for the nearly unlimited investor demand for structured finance instruments will be explained later. Nevertheless the risk of a too capital market orientated refinancing strategy was neglected. The worldwide supervision authorities ignored that and underestimated the risks and complexity of structured finance instruments for banks and for the whole financial system.
Especially the risk increased due to the high demand for securitizations because banks could not generate enough underlyings with their standard business procedures. The consequence was a reduction of bank lending standards. Kiff and Mills (2007) showed that securitization could lead to lax screening and less monitoring effort. Franke (2005) mentioned that beside the moral hazard problem also the danger for adverse selection rises.
Together with the high motivation of hedge funds to invest in structured finance instruments a dangerous cycle started. But why had hedge funds and other market participants such a high demand for structured finance instruments? fund demand for structured finance instruments increased and banks generated enormous underlyings with less and less due diligence to fulfill the demand ( figure 14) . Amplified was the cycle with the high ratings of credit rating agencies that suggest default protection and cheap money due to low US interest rates. The behavior was rational to invest in hedge funds, to originate structured finance instruments and to use more capital market orientated funding from a bank point of view.
From a macro perspective this had to lead to a financial crisis. As the crisis occurred in 2007 the demand for structured finance instruments dried up, the banks had to provide liquidity facilities, fulfill margin calls and guarantee for the hedge fund losses which ended in a liquidity crunch. These systemic risks were predictable and a main failure of worldwide supervision and regulation authorities. The reasons for the drying-out are shown in the liquidity crunch cycle in figure 15 . Banks relied to heavy on cheaper secondary market funding. As the subprime crisis started the ABCPs of the banks own conduits were bought by the originating banks to avoid the draw of liquidity facilities. As this was not enough the liquidity facilities were drawn which led to rating triggers and downgrades for the structured finance instruments and for the originating bank. Both traditional funding and secondary market funding got more expensive or temporary impossible leading to a liquidity crunch. The banks dependence on secondary market funding via structured finance instruments depends on the incorporation of future gains and losses. To prevent future crises it is necessary that banks see the origination of structured finance instruments not as a one-time game that lead to moral hazard behavior. If they see the origination as an infinitely repeated game they also have to incorporate future gains and losses into their decision and will support financial stability with their more conservative behavior. In the actual discussion about banking regulation the regulator has to reduce the bank dependence on secondary market funding in a way that the cycle shown in figure 15 will not be critical for the liquidity positions of banks. As explained before the discount factor of future gains and losses influence the decision of banking behavior. Many banks struggled in the subprime crisis with liquidity problems which could easily be explained with game theory.
Especially the uncertainty due to biased structured finance ratings led to a drying-out of the interbank market. The behavior of the banks could be easily explained with game theoretic approaches like the prisoner´s dilemma (Gibbons (1992)). If there is high uncertainty in the interbank market banking group one and two play maximin strategies to prevent losses and reach the equilibrium (γ, γ).
This "not lending" behavior lead to higher spreads and in extreme to a situation where all banks do this tradeoff. The result is a complete drying-out of the interbank market (Brunnermeier (2009) ). This has already enormous consequences for systemic risk and financial stability but will be amplified if this game is also played between banks and investors regarding commercial paper sales. If also the commercial paper market is close to a drying-out there is no other chance to prevent a collapse of the financial system with state guarantees and central bank initiatives. This phenomenon could be observed since the financial crisis 2007.
Analyzing the banking behavior we could determine that banking behavior was rational on a micro-level and in short to mid-term. Three conclusions follow: it is important that banks´ dependence on secondary market liquidity and the regulatory disregarding of off-balance sheet positions are limited.
Rating agencies should be regulated with an international framework to guarantee that the expected default probabilities are highly correlated with the realized defaults. All three aspects are very important to restore confidence in financial markets. Before we evaluate actual regulatory approaches regarding these aspects, we give a short introduction to banking regulation.
Banking regulation and structured finance enhancements
Financial market stability is very important for a growing real economy. But strong international competition, shadow banking and moral hazard behavior make financial markets more complex and interdependent. For prevention banking regulation is very important.
Banking regulation restricts the financial markets and because of that every regulation initiative has to be well considered. Regulation is adequate if depositors and states are prevented from losses. It is important to understand that the goal of regulation is not to prevent losses in general, but to prevent moral hazard behavior. Bhattacharya et al. (1998) provides a good overview of regulation literature. Some aspects to highlight are the possibility for passive money creation which has direct effects to the money supply of an economy and to price stability. Some authors are of the opinion that the banking system has a tendency for instability. In this context keywords like "gambling for resurrection", "too big to fail" or "lender of last resort" support the instability hypothesis especially if we look at the last three crises. or the "Basel III consultation paper". These enhancements and consultations are necessary but the danger is that proposals are discussed that were developed too fast. The whole Basel regulation was developed and implemented within 5-10 years. Of course there are failures that are obvious which could be corrected in a very simple way, but there are other interdependencies that are not seen today, leading to possible overregulation that did not prevent crises but have important consequences for economic growth. Especially the "Basel III consultation paper" have to be seen very critical. Therefore we want to have a look at actual regulation consultation papers and evaluate it with respect to the findings of the last chapters.
EU-regulation on credit rating agencies
As noted before credit rating agencies ( If a rating could not fulfill the requirements due to a lack of reliable data or the complexity of the structure, the CRAs should not provide a credit rating or withdraw an existing credit rating. To rise transparency and disburden the investors due diligence CRAs should use own rating categories for structured finance instruments and mark them specially.
To be provided. This is overregulation and prevents innovation and growth in the financial industry. We propose a new rating category for financial innovations which could be linked with higher risk weights. Then institutional investors could decide whether they want to invest in these new financial instruments.
Basel II enhancements
After we evaluated the regulation of CRAs, we want to have a look at the regulation initiatives of the Basel Committee. In the actual credit risk securitisation framework is no differentiation between securitisations and resecuritisations under the IRB approach. So paragraph 541 (i) was supplemented. Basel (2009a) defined that "even if only one of the underlying exposures is a securitisation exposure, any tranched position exposed to that pool is considered a resecuritisation exposure". This is also in force for credit derivatives or ABCP programmes which is a debatable extension. As a result the resecuritisation exposures got own risk weights for the IRB approach that are higher than for standard securitisation exposures.
Based on the empirical work for the estimation of IRB resecuritisation risk weights also standardised approach (SA) resecuritisation risk weights were introduced. The SA risk weights are in the average of the risk weight bands for the IRB approach and in line with the philosophy of the standard Basel II approach.
Another important safety net is margin calls. Ratings have direct consequences to rating triggers and are directly linked to reputational risk.
Brunnermeier (2009) showed the liquidity drying-out in the last crisis. This drying-out was an enormous problem for many conduits that refinanced their exposures via short term ABCP programmes. Instead of drawing the conduits liquidity facility the originating bank decided to buy by itself the ABCPs and paradoxical availed from that opportunity. Basel (2009a) noted that the bank "benefited from the external rating on the commercial paper when assigning a risk weight to that paper, even though the rating was due in large part to the bank´s own support of the conduit in the form of the liquidity facility".
Banks should not benefit any more from lower risk weights due to self guarantees because there is no additional support that legitimate that lower minimal capital requirements, i.e. just regulatory arbitrage. The Basel Committee added therefore paragraph 565(g)(i), 565(g)(ii) and 565(g)(iii).
As shown before the banks securitisation due diligence was fragmentary. Additionally there were also lots of changes to banks risk management procedures in the supervisory review process and disclosure requirements in the context of securitisation that are over the scope of this paper. Obvious failures occurred by the development of Basel II, shown trough the subprime crisis, were corrected. The enhancements are necessary and not disputable.
They will prevent possible cycles like shown in figure 12 but will not affect the standard structured finance issuance. The enormous policy pressure to develop more rigorous banking supervision frameworks is dangerous. In the subprime crisis regulatory faults were used to create regulatory gains. This was still possible despite the long development time of Basel II. Therefore actual regulatory consultation papers have to be considered and evaluated carefully.
Basel III consultation paper
After 1.) The quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital base will be raised.
2.) The risk coverage of the capital framework will be strengthened. As showed before in BIS (2009a) for the risk coverage from trading book and securitization exposures.
3.) Introduction of a leverage-ratio.
4.) Introduction of a series of measures to promote the build up of capital buffers in good times to reduce the existing Basel II procyclical behavior.
5.) A 30-day liquidity coverage ratio and a longer-term structural liquidity ratio will be introduced to guarantee a global minimum liquidity standard.
After we introduced the main areas of regulatory changes we want to go now a step further and evaluate the approaches regarding structured finance instruments.
To strengthen the quality of tier 1/2 capital to absorb losses, certain securitization exposures which are currently deducted 50% from Tier 1 and 50% Additionally Basel (2009b) mentioned that the Committee is reviewing the revised securitization framework. Again the basic question is whether these products complement financial markets or if they were moral hazard intended to gain regulatory arbitrage. The former Basel II framework invited the banks to play a "one-period" game, to disregard the necessary due diligence and to neglect the possible future development of systemic risk. The rating agencies had an incentive to produce good ratings. Banks had therewith a lower minimum capital requirement and more possibilities how to deal with these structured finance exposures. The same risk existed for cliff effects.
Basel ( capital requirements in the range of €300 billion. Especially because a leverage ratio is a "simple, non-risk-based" measure it would reduce the risk sensitivity of the banking systems and fails to reduce financial instability.
Frenkel and Rudolf (2010) mentioned that it is unrealistic to increase the required equity in the short term. As a compromise the Basel Committee should think about partial ratios that measure for example the dependence on capital marked based refinancing or about higher risk weights if certain thresholds are exceeded. Other ratios like the balance sheet duration of possible securitization assets or a ratio for off-balance sheet positions are also conceivable. Without question the banking systems needs a higher level of equity but to constrain banks with a leverage ratio is the wrong way and dangerous for worldwide economic growth.
Summary
In 2007 the world faced one of the biggest financial crises ever. It was the third important financial crisis in the last 12 years. Spillovers to the real economy and moral hazard behaviour of carpetbaggers resulted in enormous pressure on worldwide political institutions to approve a more rigorous regulation on financial institutions and predict financial crises via early warning systems. As shown in chapter two the development of an early warning system is still elusive and most models did not incorporate structured finance indicators. We showed that every financial crisis is different and analyzed the behaviour of structured finance ratings and structured finance issuance and outstanding in detail. Failures in rating methodologies are evidently and most of the structured finance instruments had normal growth rates. The combination and supply of home equity loan ABS, RMBS and CDO² based on structured finance instruments are one important catalyst of the subprime crisis and mainly driven by exogenous factors like low US interest rates, social policy and failures in Basel II. Afterwards we showed that banking behaviour was rational on a micro-level but must lead to a systemic crisis on a macro-level tightening with the drying-out of the liquidity markets. We found evidence in the Bearingpoint securitization survey (2009) and in two theoretical approaches shown in figures 14 and 15. As conclusion we see three important areas for regulatory changes. The bank dependence on secondary market funding must be limited and measured. Off-balance sheet positions must be supervised and could not be Tier 1 capital any more.
CRAs have to be regulated to restore confidence in financial markets and to raise the reliance on ratings used for regulatory purposes. With this background we evaluated three important regulatory approaches. The EU regulation of CRAs acts on our topics and is a step in the right direction if it is implemented with international coordination. Nevertheless we see the nonproviding of ratings for financial instruments with a low historical database as critical and propose a separate rating category for new financial instruments together with higher Basel II risk weights. The Basel II enhancements from July 2009 were a first reaction to the crisis and solved the main regulatory problems shown in the subprime crisis. With discomfort we evaluated some aspects of the Basel III consultation paper. Many aspects are disputable and are in the right direction, but the introduction of a leverage ratio is false. Of course, the banking system needs a higher level of equity but this goal should not be achieved via a leverage ratio. A leverage ratio has significant impact for the worldwide economies and will reduce economic growth for years. Additionally, a risk insensitive leverage ratio will not prevent financial crises and animate banks to have higher risks on their balance sheet. As a compromise we propose partial ratios that measure for example the dependence on capital marked based refinancing (like a liquidity ratio), the balance sheet duration of possible securitization assets or a ratio for offbalance sheet positions.
